proletariat'. 12 As we find ourselves in what has been perceived as a new geological epoch, a human-centric worldview may no longer be tenable. Life as we know it can no longer sustain itself and global environmental change has introduced a new urgency to critical legal thinking and demands that 'normal' certainties are inverted, or even dissolved. 13 Extreme weather, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, pollution and flooding have come to symbolise the sensitivity of Gaia, but planet Earth is also materially affected and the idea of some critical thinkers that we only have one Earth, 14 forces us to think about the ecology of the Anthropocene. 15 In pursuit of such an endeavour, this chapter explores the challenges and opportunities of the Anthropocene for environmental law. Through a closer reading of anthropology and eco-philosophy, a new legal terrain is (re)discovered wherein the laws of nature dictate a new contract between living and non-living entities in the universe as an 'ultimate' attempt to save the Earth and all its living and non-living habitants. To this end, Part II below explores rights of nature from a historical perspective as a counter narrative to the commodification of nature. Parts III and IV discuss the material and ontological turn in anthropology respectively. Part V looks into representing alterity from an ontological perspective which is then further discussed in Part VI where anthropology is brought into conversation with law through a detailed reading of the work of the eco-philosopher Michel Serres. The final part of the chapter offers contemporary examples of rights of nature, which resemble some of the legal propositions that were discussed in the previous parts.
II. Counter Discourse
As a counter force to the principle of commodification and capitalisation of nature, Ecuadorian activists have lobbied and embraced a rights-based approach to nature. 16 Lévi-Strauss' vision was very much based around the idea that the centrality of the rights of people that were being debated in the Assembly had to be dismantled and displaced. 19 He argued that the concept of rights needed to encompass all living species.
For Lévi-Strauss it was clear that humans had no right to wipe out whole ecosystems or species without charges that border on genocide. Yet, several years later we are still debating the viability of ecocide as a potential new crime in law. 20 As an anthropologist immersed in local settings and other non-Western worldviews, Lévi-Strauss was particularly concerned about extending rights to all living species, including rocks and birds:
The right to life and to the free development of the living species still represented on the earth, is the only rights that can be called inalienable -for the simple reason that the disappearance of any species leaves us with an irreparable void in the system of creation. 21 Lévi-Strauss saw his intervention at the French National Assembly as the 'beginning of a new declaration of rights'. 22 One approach that has been widely advocated to embody to some extent the idea of the rights of nature, is a human right to a healthy environment. 23 Doubts are raised though if a human rights framework is sufficient to raise the principle of environmental protection to a higher level of ecological sustainability that recognises human obligations towards ecosystems and the environment as a foundational principle or Grundnorm of legal, political and social systems. 24 In the present worldview, the biosphere has no legal standing within human rights law and a non-negotiable ecological bottom line fails to materialise in what is essentially and to its core an anthropocentric human rights regime. 25 The issue of climate change has been trying to call us to attention and to move us into action, but as Anna Grear observes:
While we wrestle with epistemological quandaries and doubts concerning the best state of our knowledge and debate the best way forward, we are faced with a planetary crisis. The evidence is mounting: a multitude of material and bio-physical signs point to the threat of impending environmental breakdown. 26 According to Grear, responding to planetary ontic limits seems beyond the reach of human rights language, despite its wider and powerful achievements: '[t] he anthropocentric limitations of the Western human rights tradition reinforces anthropocentrism as a form of grave ecological blindness'. 27 In practice, this means that environmental law needs to step up and provide adequate protection mechanisms for preserving nature and ecosystems. Unfortunately, environmental law has often been developed without taking into account the wider ethical context. 28 What is important within the context of the urgency of the Anthropocene is to embrace and think through the possibilities that could be developed if environmental law were to shift its focus to establish a more ethical and sustainable relationship between human cultures and nonhuman 'others'. 29 For present purposes, this means that environmental law should, among others, seek inspiration from other disciplinary theoretical debates about the relationship between culture and nature, by specifically reflecting upon the encounter between humans and non-humans and how this encounter has been theorised in anthropology and (environmental) continental philosophy and apply some of the thinking in these other disciplines to environmental law.
III. Materiality
A dialogue needs to be established amongst different cultures how we -as a collective of human species -engage with the environment. The most compelling discourse on this matter resides in indigenous peoples' cultures and their worldviews, 30 a proposition that I will return to later. The cultural and legal milieu of indigenous peoples' being and worldviews can provide novel cognitive insights into the materiality of the current environmental crisis and can become the conduit for taking the question of materiality to environmental law. A renewed focus on the material world offers a fresh look at what it means to be human and its relationship with the non-human world.
The material world has for a long time been the central focus of actor-network theories in science and technology. Socio-cultural and philosophical anthropology have also experienced what has been labelled an ontological turn, with a renewed interest in the meaning of the material world. Explained in more detail later, the turn to ontology in anthropology is mainly associated with the work of Philippe Descola, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Bruno Latour. 31 Their scholarship has mainly been in reaction to their belief that the broad humanist linguistic turn in socio-cultural anthropology is illequipped to grapple with and confront the environmental and socio-ecological problems in the Anthropocene. What defines the Anthropocene is the entanglement of human and non-human conditions and futures, raising ethical and political questions that can no longer be treated as exclusively human problems. 32 Kohn defines ontological anthropology as 'a non-reductive ethnographic exploration of realities' that is not socially constructed. The ontological turn in anthropology is in response to current ecological, existential, ethical and political problems. 33 These problems force us to think about human life in a world where the future of the human being is in danger. Consequently we also need to consider the kind of life and future that is beyond the human being, as it were. 34 The ontological turn follows on from a previous correlational turn in philosophy which, according to Quentin 31 E Kohn, 'Anthropology of Ontologies ' (2015) Meillassoux, has limited philosophy to the study of human thought and kept philosophy away from studying the 'great outdoors'; the world beyond human representation. 35 In the troubling times of the Anthropocene, however, Latour 36 calls us to attention when he compares the apocalyptic collapse of Gaia 37 to the apocalyptic futurism of the Paraguyan Ayereo. 38 Gaia is perceived as the immunological reaction of the Earth; 39 for Latour, Gaia has the power to summon us in the same way as gods used to do. As the Earth is placed in a 'state of exception' 40 , it demands everyone to make decisions about life and death until a new political body emerges. Describing the condition of Gaia as a 'feverish form of palsy', 41 usefully summarises the need to acknowledge that the world is not just made up of signifying or discursive realities; there is something deeply material about the world. 42 animal mask'. 77 Perspectivism offers law another view on personhood which is no longer an 'absolute, diacritical property' of some (elitist and chosen) species, but to occupy a point of view or to have personhood depends on the context and is a question of degree. In some Amazonian contexts, animals may have more agency than some humans and are therefore perceived to have the characteristics of a human rather than an animal. This does not mean that non-human personhood is a given fact; whether or not a specific species can be a prosopomorphic agent capable of affecting humans is always open-ended, dependent as it is on context and personal experience. 78 The context though is defined in Amerindian terms and cannot be imported ready-made from our own perspective. 79 The relevance of perspectivism for environmental law is that it offers the opportunity to go beyond an anthropocentric understanding of law as perspectivism clearly shows that the distinction between nature and culture is a
Western point of view not shared in other worldviews, such as the Amazonian ones.
B. Beyond Nature and Culture
Although the translation of the work of Viveiros de Castro has raised the awareness of an ontological turn in anthropology, Descola and his suspension of the category 'nature'
as the basis of an anthropological enquiry about difference, provided the initial groundwork for an ontological turn. 80 Lévi-Strauss' work, focusing on native thoughts and worldviews as having merit in their own right, has influenced Descola and others.
His legacy is even more radical when he argues that when anthropologists attempt to think through the thoughts of the 'Others', ontological properties of the universe can be Latour is particularly known for bringing nature into culture and culture into nature. His work has often been labelled as being part of the broad ontological turn, as it is linked to ANT and therefore perceived as a form of symmetrical anthropology. This means that we are dealing with a flat ontology which refuses to give priority to any one actor. The world consists of many different actors and agencies and none is more important than the other. ANT overcomes the mind-body dualism by assuming that everything is like minded, both in agency as matter. 89 Studying encounters between humans and non-humans in science and technology studies, Latour has 'discovered' a sense of material worlds and social actions between humans and non-humans. According to Latour, any kind of knowledge, including legal knowledge, is not just abstract knowledge but is always part of society and its social fabrications and also has a material aspect. 90 Latour highlights the materiality of law through its engagement with space, archives, databases and forensic models. 91 For the purpose of law, the question remains: can law's materiality also be extended to other forms of materiality such as pollution, flooding, earthquakes and climate change?
V. Knowledge and Experience in the Anthropocene
The ontological turn described above is not without its critics, 92 but instead of engaging with some of these critiques -valuable as they may be -it is more useful for present purposes to distil the main points that unite the ontologists and then to use these as a starting point for the wider dialogue concerning the relationship between law and anthropology. Anthropology, maybe more than any other discipline, must accept and 89 Kohn (n 31). is not only perceived as a means to rescue anthropology in a posthuman world, but it is also thought that the ontological turn could come to the rescue of the planet and its life forms. 97 To summarise, as the cosmos is in a desperate state, the Anthropos needs to be rethought and the ontological turn in anthropology offers the scope to think beyond the human, and revive a radical alterity. This is not just a task for anthropology, but also for law, which will have to think and act upon its own need for an ontological turn (see the discussion further below). words, the ontological turn also seeks to create an alternative understanding of language and semiology. Human language is perceived to be a sign, which in the Saussurean tradition 101 is treated simultaneously as having no direct connection to the object it represents and the meaning of the sign is also pre-fixed by 'a set of codified relations it has to other such signs in the system of signs'. 102 The Saussurean approach towards language distinguishes between the signs and the world to which these signs refer to without giving any thought how these gaps can be connected. By way of summary, the ontological turn in social and cultural theory shows that language plays an important role in representation and realisation of knowledge; but critically, it also obscures the world and prevents direct access to experience. This occurs against the backdrop of the Anthropocene, which calls for a renewed interest in how bodies sense environments and events, including 'activities which cannot be captured with words but have a material existence on and beyond the boundaries with language and knowledge '. 110 Critical environmental law may be particularly receptive to an ontological turn. 111 Environmental law has been for too long dislodged from reality; a reality which is currently vividly explicated by the Anthropocene. As is widely accepted, (environmental) law is deeply entwined with anthropocentrism to the extent that it treats nature as objects. Although more recently nature, and particularly animals, may be treated as legal subjects, this subjectivity or legal personhood is still very different from that of humans and it is language that plays a crucial role in this distinction. 112 The language in which environmental law has to express itself or communicate its intentionality needs a radical shift. A promising start has been made within the wider debate of critical environmental law. Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has proposed useful interventions, which resonate with my suggestions for a legal ontological turn. As he argues:
[T]he task of a critical environmental law is to work along its connection with ecology, indeed within this open ecology of disciplinary and ontological fluidity, and construct a new language in order to communicate about this new home. The challenge is multiple, not least because this language can no longer be 'just' a language but rather a performance of wholehearted embracing of materiality. It is not coincidental that environmental law is the most readily available means to drag law outside its linguistic ivory tower and land it on the material, the social, the corporeal, the gendered, the spatial, the animal, the molecular. Ultimately what defines the Anthropocene is that both Earth and humans have lost their status as subject, both have become objects and are forced together in their loss of being able to act autonomously; they are both doomed to share agency with other subjects that have lost their freedom to act. This also means that what previously was deemed impossible in the ontology of science to be both subject and object, the Anthropocene has blurred the boundaries between subjects and objects. 119 As a consequence, dreams of human mastery over Earth have to be abandoned; a proposition that has repercussions for law and how law treats nature. The urgency of the Anthropocene no longer allows us to reduce nature and the Earth to our object; to share agency with the Earth means that we may have to question the presumption that we humans occupy an exceptional position in law because of our linguistic freedom. This is where the conversation between anthropology and law may contribute to a new understanding that humans no longer occupy a special place in law based on their linguistic skills. As Hoffmeyer argues:
The needs of all living beings for expressing a degree of anticipatory capacity is seen as an evolutionary lever for the development of species with increased semiotic freedom. Human intentionality is not therefore unique in the world but must be understood as a peculiar and highly sophisticated instantiation of a general semiotics of nature. Biosemiotics offers a way to explicate intentionality naturalistically. 120
As the Anthropocene is the epoch that subverts and mixes objects and subjects, the meaning of the world is no longer just an expression of language. The Anthropocene requires an ontological proposition to semiotics. The world, the Earth, the cosmos and the universe need to be understood in themselves and are not only a feature of representation through the language about the world, the Earth, the cosmos and the 121 What Kohn shows in his accounts of Amazonian encounters is that thinking is not circumscribed by language, the symbolic or the human. Reflecting upon a hunting expedition he witnessed, Kohn records in detail how monkeys fled high up in palm trees when a hunter failed to kill them. He describes subsequently how the hunter was first imitating the sound of a falling tree before he actually felt down the tree, but the monkey reacted already to the before-the-fact imitation, she took the imitation of a felling tree as a sign that could shake the monkey out if its security. According to Kohn the monkey perceived the sound of the shaking perch as a sign of danger, for Kohn the monkey's reaction to the moving perch was not a mechanical reaction of cause and effect. The monkey was able to connect the sign of the trembling perch as something dangerously different from the present sense of security: the branch could break off, a jaguar might be climbing up the tree, but something is going to happen and the monkey felt she had to do something about it; the sign of the shaking branch provided information to the monkey to make a connection between what was currently happening and what might potentially happen, the sound and the movement of the shaking branch gave the monkey information about an absent future and she reacted accordingly. For more details, see Kohn (n 51) at 27-71.
dramatically, storytelling is no longer the prerogative of human language; being thrown in the world is by itself already a story that is fully articulated and active. 122
The French eco-philosopher Michel Serres, whose work is dedicated 'to (re)-connect the modern subject to the universe and to (re-)discover his or her small place in the larger biotic community of life', 123 provides insights in how to capture the materiality of the human condition, and shows the opportunity that can be created for law when the distinction between objects and subjects is blurred. Senses allow getting closer to the experience of the everyday life, something that cannot be achieved through language as the latter can only mediate knowledge and cannot provide direct access to experience. 129 In the poetic words of Serres:
Since the beginning of our history, the global and the local world -from the glory of the heavens down to its smallest details and folds, furrows, marshy places and small pebbles -has slumbered beneath the waters of language, inaccessible and swallowed up like the great cathedral. No-one could go to the object without passing through it, just as no-one gathers seaweed, without, in some unimaginable space, getting his arm wet. 130
Serres' oeuvre shows that the origin of language lies in the rhythms and calls of the natural world. 131 Through a deeply poetic engagement, he manages to capture the fragility and beauty of the Earth. 132 Serres' attempts to rethink the relationship between humanity and the rest of the universe through expressing the ontological principles that govern the universe and the existence of all living and non-living creatures is poignant, especially now that the Earth is facing one of its most epic challenges. Serres' biosemiotics also challenge and shape our understanding of the existence of the nonhuman world. 133 The field of biosemiotics shows that signification 134 is not limited to material existence of bodies. Bodies signify not only the material existence beyond language, but also encompass the relations and intricate networks between multiple material forms in the world. 136 Inspired by the theoretical underpinnings of the science and technology movement, Serres seeks to re-empiricise social and cultural theory, but his turn to bodies and senses should not be understood as a return to a phenomenological embodied experience, as these are still limited to a signification and representation in which language plays a dominant force. In essence, senses must be freed from this meaning.
As argued throughout this chapter, the first step towards an ontological turn in (environmental) law is to experiment how to understand the non-human world. Crucial in this endeavour is for law to find a way to go beyond the old dichotomous thinking of nature versus culture. After all, it is such Cartesian thinking that has been held accountable for the current socio-ecological crisis. While Amazonian encounters between humans and non-humans may provide insights on how to achieve conversations between humans and non-humans, they are context specific and therefore will not travel easily to a Western context. This is not to say that the dialogue that was set up in this chapter between anthropology and law has been fruitless. On the contrary, it offered us a platform from which to start thinking that human language is not the only way to represent the world. This means that law is not just language; nature dictates laws through its natural processes. Biosemiosis may be precisely the tool that could (re)-acquaint the discourse of law with its materiality. As environmental law deals with pollution, climate change, flooding, drought and ecological disasters, it is automatically exposed to its own materiality; environmental law has a material presence. 137 Therefore law not only needs to deal with the continuum between humans and non-humans, it also needs to find its own materiality; or to put it differently, law needs to claim its own sensory presence. 138 This is where Serres' narratology may become a useful 'instrument' to challenge and shape the way law understands the non-human world and the relationship between humans and non-humans. Serres has developed what he calls a Grand Récit (the Great Story) of the universe as a way to develop a new non-anthropocentric humanism. 139 For Serres, humanity derives its identity from its place in the universal narrative of the Great Story, and not from any biological or psychological specificity that highlights the difference between humans and non-humans. Next, Serres pulls the human further into the story that it shares with the rest of the universe. Serres identifies four moments in the Great Story that leads to the existence of human beings, but what is remarkable is that Serres tells the story through an inversed ordering, where each event is more ancient than the last. The first event takes us back millions of years when homo sapiens emerged on the planet. The second event is the emergence of life on Earth, from the first RNA (ribonucleic acid) with the capability to duplicate itself, through the three billion of years when bacteria were the dominant life-form, to the explosion of multi-cellular organisms recorded in the Burgess shale and the huge proliferation of orders, families, genera and species. 140
The third event travels back from biology to astrophysics and the formation of material bodies or matter in a young universe that was still expanding and cooling. The last and most distant event is 'the birth of the universe itself, the origins of the origins'. 141 What is the relevance of these stories in terms of discrediting the nature-culture divide and what can it tell us about the role of law in the Anthropocene?
Serres answers the first part of this question during an interview in the Cahier de l'Herne, when he argues that understanding humanity in the context of the Great Story, allows us to get a new sense of culture that can be traced back not only to Greek and Mesopotamian civilisations, but in fact 15 billion years ago. The Great Story also highlights that the universe can 'write' its own story through its physical presence and the rhythms of its natural processes. The story of the universe is much older than the act of writing, which was discovered some 4000 years ago. In his seminal work, le Contrat Naturel, 145 Serres, inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's social contract, argues that the only way to save the planet and by extension our own species, requires a paradigm shift that ultimately redefines the relationship between human beings and the rest of the universe. In his distinctive style, Serres holds humans accountable for waging a war against the planet with an arsenal of homocentric logic, scientific discoveries and technological advances. One of the ethical imperatives that Serres develops is the parasite, 146 a trope he uses to remind us that 'a parasite with an insatiable appetite for consumption inevitably destroys its host, thereby preparing its own disappearance'. 147 Serres refers to another trope of mastery to prompt us that we should stop 'attempting to master every last material particle for the exclusive benefit of humanity'. 148 Instead, Serres proposes that we develop a partnership -a natural contract -with the universe as a way to emphasise that as a species we are interdependent. 149 Serres argues that at the basis of our civilisation lies the social contract that we humans signed as a collective, and that allowed us to leave the state of nature before there was a state. 150 Let's have lunch together: when the salad bowl is passed, all one of us has to spit in it and it's all his, since no one else will want any more if it. He will have polluted that domain and we will consider dirty that which, being clean only to him he now owns. No one else ventures again into the places devastated by whoever occupies them in this way.
[…] A living species, ours, is succeeding in excluding all the others from its niche, which is now global: how could other species eat or live in that which we cover with filth? If the soiled world is in danger, it's the result of our exclusive appropriation of things. 153
The contract we signed that allowed us to leave the state of nature to form society was silent about the natural world; the pact that was signed neglected nature. 154 Natural law as perceived by the Enlightenment philosophers, was the law of reason and reason governs everyone; natural law was universal and followed human nature, which was reduced to either reason or history. 155 The natural law of reason nullified the natural law of nature. 156 Human reason conquered nature through a system of property rights;
nature was possessed and pronounced as an object of the law. Initially only civilised men could be legal subjects, but progressively the definition of legal subjects has broadened and over time, women, indigenous peoples and other poor and marginalised groups were given the status of legal subject. The social contract became more of a completed project, but nature that gave us food, shelter, heat and water never became a legal subject. In the Anthropocene, nature writes back and (re)claims its legal status as subject. As humans have abused nature, nature threatens or has already taken away our food, shelter, heat and water. former parasites have to become symbionts; the excesses they committed against their hosts puts the parasites in mortal danger, for dead hosts can no longer feed or house them. When the epidemic ends, even the microbes disappear, for lack of carriers for their proliferation. 158
The only way that we can prevent from destroying the Earth -and ourselves -is by signing a contract with nature. 159 Law is the institution that can limit a one-sided parasitic action. 160 In order to (re)-discover the Earth we have to taste, touch, feel, smell and hear a cosmos to which everything is linked. 161 For the universe as our host to become our symbiont, we need to be in tune again with the world, the worldly and the physical. We need to go back to nature. If nature is a subject and no longer an object, it can sign a legal contract, and the language of the contract is scripted in the rhythms of nature, the Earth. Serres gives the example of the floods of the Nile as a sign or rhythm of property law:
EGYPT'S WAY. The first laws on Earth. Given normal weather, the Nile's floods submerged the borders of tillable fields in the alluvial valley fertilized by the great river. At the return of low water, royal officials called harpedonaptai, who were surveyors or geometers, measured anew the land mixed with mud and silt to redistribute or attribute its parts. Life got going again. Everyone went home to get back to work. 165 Flood thus influences laws of property. Floods take away previous measurements of parcels; 'it takes the world back to disorder, to primal chaos, to time zero, right back to nature'. 166 Laws of nature make decisions and divide the fields, and while the legislator may dictate and apply the law, the origins lie in the force and rhythms of nature. The birth of law lies in nature; the redistribution is in the hands of the harpedonaptai who give birth to a new law that uses the technology of geometry to divide the land. 167
VII. Conclusion
This chapter attempted to establish a dialogue with those disciplines that have embraced more fully than law has managed to do, the continuum between culture and nature, and consequently a return to the material world. A closer reading of the ontological turn in anthropology and a conversation with the eco-philosophy of Serres has shown us the need to urgently return to the laws of nature, albeit in a very different way than classical natural law, which considers nature our host and not our symbiont.
The Anthropocene and its material expression of climate change, environmental destruction and loss of biodiversity, to name a few, have made nature and the Earth a legal subject again. Nature is no longer just material for appropriation. While law has tried to limit the abusive parasitism of human beings through social contracts, the same action of a contractual obligation to curb parasitism has not yet been applied to the relationship between nature and humans. The sustained reason that has been used to justify politics and law as exclusive human activities still rests on the uniqueness of human language. The missing capacity for language imposes an objectivity to nature and deprives nature of any legal subjectivity. As nature lacks language, it cannot reason order through speech as a substitute for violence, and nature thus remains in a state of violence and excluded from political and legal life.
This chapter has shown that there are other ways of signification than just through language. Nature has its own way of complicated and unique ways of signification. Accepting non-linguistic representations as a form of signifying practice, opens up new possibilities for extending sovereignty beyond the state and the relationship with the human. As argued in this chapter, the Anthropocene is characterised by the blurring of boundaries between humans and non-humans, and between legal subjects and objects. The Anthropocene forces us to think more along the lines of a continuum, but this also has consequences for the concept of sovereignty.
Sovereignty is no longer a political or legal concept that can only be attributed through language or human species. As Youatt shows:
if we consider what sovereignty looks like from the perspective of other animals, we see that they encounter human polities on their own semiotic terms -a wolf-pack cannot recognise a nation-state as sovereign in a formal or declarative way, but it can recognise human markers of territoriality, make judgments about insiders and outsiders, and assess threats to its way of life on which it acts. …The politics of sovereignty takes place not only in human language, but also in other registers, involving semiotic markers of bodily gesture, visual and pheromonal signals, and complex forms of vocalisations. 168
All this amounts to recognising that non-human life can be a legal subject, and around the world examples are emerging of explicitly granting rights for nature.
Ecuador's Constitution is the most well-known example that acknowledges respect for the existence of Pacha Mama and providing it a right to restoration. 169 Bolivia recognises that nature has the right to continue its ecosystem processes without human 168 Youatt, 'Interspecies Relations, International Relations' (n 112) at 220. 169 Chapter 7 of the Ecuadorian Constitution 2008 on the Rights of Nature states in Art 71 that 'nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes'. For more details, see the Ecuadorian Constitution, ch 7, Arts 71-74, which can be downloaded at:
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html.
alteration and protected from pollution. 170 In New Zealand, the Whanganui River has been granted legal personhood. 171 Despite the sense that we should celebrate that rights of nature are being recognised in constitutions and statutes, we also need to recognise with caution that the way nature has been brought into these legal framings is not without its own flaws. What made nature appear in the Ecuadorian Constitution, is not the recognition of nature as a political actor per se, but it involved a decade-long struggle between Chevron and indigenous peoples over environmental damage caused by oil spills. 172 It seems that for all their progressiveness, the above examples all suggest that the inclusion of non-human life forms in political and legal institutions still require human speech acts. The danger is that these so-called broad-minded forms of recognising rights of nature continue to reproduce anthropocentrism. including an appreciation of a wider implication that law may turn its attention to the importance of biosemiotics when studying the meaning and role of (environmental) law in the Anthropocene.
